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and consequentialism (e.g., “torture can be good if it accounts for more positive than negative outcomes”)
may play a critical role. We used Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) handbook to construct four ultra-short
stories for every strength: the stories depict various agents engaging in strength-related behavior (e.g., a
young student courageously stepping up against school bullies). We prompted participants to rate these
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the actions’ consequences were undetermined while in the second block, the actions had either positive,
negative, or mixed consequences, which we used to compute proxies of participants’ inclinations toward
deontology and consequentialism. The ratings of N = 230 German-speaking laypersons suggest that the
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were undetermined, and positive consequences did not account for or increase this effect. However, moral
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judgment, honesty, kindness, fairness, and hope). Furthermore, specific character strengths (measured
by self-report) were connected with more positive evaluations (e.g., endorsing spirituality was connected
with rating spirituality as more positively valued). Both deontology and consequentialism were connected
with more positive evaluations, and we suggest two hypotheses to explain how such inclinations can
lead to perceiving character strengths as positively valued. Our findings highlight the importance of
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This study examines Peterson and Seligman’s (2004, p. 19) claim that every VIA
character strength “(. . .) is morally valued in its own right, even in the absence of obvious
beneficial outcomes”. Although this criterion assumes a pivotal role in distinguishing
character from personality, no previous study has investigated its validity. Based on
what Peterson and Seligman (2004) have provided us with, we describe how we built
our study around indirectly testing every strength’s assumed moral evaluation, in which
inclinations toward deontology (e.g., “torture is wrong regardless of tangible positive
outcomes”) and consequentialism (e.g., “torture can be good if it accounts for more
positive than negative outcomes”) may play a critical role. We used Peterson and
Seligman’s (2004) handbook to construct four ultra-short stories for every strength:
the stories depict various agents engaging in strength-related behavior (e.g., a young
student courageously stepping up against school bullies). We prompted participants
to rate these and twelve anchor stories multiple times as to whether the agents acted
morally correct: In the first block, the actions’ consequences were undetermined while
in the second block, the actions had either positive, negative, or mixed consequences,
which we used to compute proxies of participants’ inclinations toward deontology
and consequentialism. The ratings of N = 230 German-speaking laypersons suggest
that the criterion stands: participants perceived every strength as positively morally
valued when consequences were undetermined, and positive consequences did not
account for or increase this effect. However, moral value seems to come in degrees,
and some strengths were valued more strongly than others (top five: judgment, honesty,
kindness, fairness, and hope). Furthermore, specific character strengths (measured by
self-report) were connected with more positive evaluations (e.g., endorsing spirituality
was connected with rating spirituality as more positively valued). Both deontology and
consequentialism were connected with more positive evaluations, and we suggest two
hypotheses to explain how such inclinations can lead to perceiving character strengths
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as positively valued. Our findings highlight the importance of scrutinizing the criteria
for character strengths, and our experimental paradigm can offer a template to further
investigate character strengths’ moral evaluation and other fundamental assumptions in
upcoming studies.
Keywords: positive psychology, VIA, experiment, moral judgment, deontology, consequentialism, utilitarianism,
process dissociation
INTRODUCTION
About 15 years ago, Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) seminal
handbook and classification brought about a renaissance of the
concept of character–a quality that has long been written off
in personality research. Today, the abundance of studies into
the positive outcomes of VIA character strengths proves that
character matters: Character strengths constitute well-being (e.g.,
Park et al., 2004a; Wagner et al., 2019), contribute to work
performance and academic achievement (e.g., Park and Peterson,
2006; Littman-Ovadia and Lavy, 2016), and build resilience
toward life’s hardships, illness, and loss (e.g., Peterson et al., 2006;
Martínez-Martí and Ruch, 2017). Indeed, there is also emerging
evidence that character strengths can contribute to sustainability
and pro-environmental behavior (e.g., Corral-Verdugo et al.,
2015; Moeller and Stahlmann, 2019). However, although we
know a lot about what character can do, we know surprisingly
little about what character is, and what sets it apart from other
individual differences. In fact, nearly all of the positive outcomes
above also pertain to the Big Five personality traits: for example,
extraversion and neuroticism predict subjective well-being (e.g.,
Diener and Lucas, 1999), conscientiousness contributes to job
performance (e.g., Barrick and Mount, 1991), and all Big Five
traits are differentially connected with resilience (Oshio et al.,
2018). Research into such positive outcomes reinstalled the
concept of character in the literature, but it did not deepen our
understanding of what makes character unique.
This gap in our knowledge is irritating because Peterson and
Seligman (2004) have provided us with a list of criteria that should
define what character is. These criteria emerged in the process
of selecting entries for the VIA classification–to consolidate their
common factors and distinguish them from seemingly related
concepts, such as talent, ability, and personality (see Peterson
and Seligman, 2004, pp. 16–28). The literature currently counts
twelve of such criteria (e.g., Park, 2018, pp. 4–5)–some of which
simply serve to ground character in the framework of individual
differences, such as traitlike (“is an individual difference
with demonstrable generality and stability”), measurable (“has
been successfully measured by researchers as an individual
difference”), and distinctiveness (“is not redundant [conceptually
or empirically] with other character strengths”). Similar to
positive outcomes, these criteria have received considerable
scientific scrutiny (e.g., traitlike: Gander et al., 2019; measurable:
McGrath, 2016; distinctiveness: McGrath, 2014), presumably
because they pertain to all individual differences and there are
hence established methods to evaluate them. Other criteria are
rather unprecedented and character-specific, such as morally
valued (“is valued in its own right and not as a means to an
end”), does not diminish others (“elevates others who witness
it, producing admiration, not jealousy”), and paragons (“is
strikingly embodied in some individuals”). These are arguably
the key criteria that make character unique, yet there has been
little discussion about their validity and even less research
into whether character strengths can indeed satisfy them
(Ruch and Stahlmann, 2019).
Superficially, these criteria may seem to be rather obvious and
straightforward–it is not hard to come up with several examples
of individuals who presumably endorsed certain strengths to
a remarkable degree, such as Pablo Picasso (creativity), Viktor
Frankl (hope), or Arnold Schwarzenegger (self-regulation).
However, the criteria also offer a more hidden, extensive
perspective, which becomes apparent when we ask, for example,
why some people can grow to become such paragons of character,
or how their actions can inspire so many others around the
world to follow in their footsteps. Scrutinizing the criteria shows
us that they cannot only describe character but provide us with
the questions whose answers allow us to explain it. In other
words: not only the correlations with sensible outcomes, but
especially the criteria are key to proving that character matters.
Accordingly, we need to rigorously explore these criteria, and
hence this account seeks to exemplify how one of them–morally
valued–can be investigated in an experimental framework.
Morally Valued Is One of the Most
Defining Yet Understudied Criteria of
Character Strengths
Among the key criteria, morally valued can be assumed a special
role because it reflects a historic paradigm shift in personality
research: At the beginning of the 20th century, Gordon Allport1
saw himself confronted with a surge of interest into the study
of what was then referred to as human nature (see Allport,
1921; Allport and Vernon, 1930). In an attempt to consolidate
the diverse literature and connect personality psychology with
the methods of natural science, he assumed famous behaviorist
Watson’s (1919) perspective that “character is defined (. . .) as
the personality evaluated according to prevailing standards of
conduct” and that “psychologists who accept Watson’s view have
no right (. . .) to include character study in the province of
psychology.” (Allport, 1921, p. 443). It is important to note that
Allport (1921) did not “banish” all such evaluative traits from
personality research: “Terms which originated in social judgment
(. . .) may and often do, become ideals or guiding principles
adopted by individuals. In this sense the introception of an ethical
ideal into subjective attitude turns a characterial designation into
1Gordon Allport served as president of the American Psychological Association in
1939 and is considered one of the founding figures of personality psychology.
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a true trait-name” (Allport and Odbert, 1936, p. 28) and hence
qualifies it for psychology. However, he did deter from research
into whether psychology can and should consider such traits
morally valued because “(t)he same behavior (. . .) may be moral
in one locality, immoral in another, moral at one period of time,
immoral at another” and “(t)here are no ‘moral traits’ until trends
in personality are evaluated” (Allport, 1927, p. 285). Peterson and
Seligman (2004) acknowledged Allport’s (1921) differentiation
according to such standards of conduct, but they rejected
his deduction because they purposefully designed the VIA
classification to only include entries that pertain to ubiquitously2
shared virtues–in contrast to culture-specific and temporarily
prevailing standards (Peterson and Seligman, 2004, pp. 33–52).
Indeed, they argue that “(t)he ubiquity of these core virtues
suggests the possibility of universality and eventually a deep
theory about moral excellence phrased in evolutionary terms.”
(Peterson and Seligman, 2004, p. 51). In this sense, character
strengths’ assumedmoral value is rightfully one of the key criteria
that distinguish them from other individual differences.
Earlier, we stated that there had been little quantitative analysis
of the key criteria, and this is especially the case for morally
valued: The literature frequently mentions it as a central one,
including two consecutive editions of The Oxford Handbook
of Positive Psychology (Peterson and Park, 2009; Park, 2018).
However, the only attempts at critical evaluation can be found
in Peterson and Seligman’s handbook (2004) and, to a lesser
extent, in a book contribution by Park and Peterson (2007), in
both of which every character strength was theoretically rated
according to whether it satisfies this criterion. Surprisingly, an
increasing number of strengths were not considered inherently
morally valued because they are believed to only “becomemorally
valued when coupled with other strengths in the classification”
(Peterson and Park, 2011, p. 52). Such strengths were referred
to as value-added (e.g., Peterson and Park, 2011, p. 52), and
Table 1 summarizes the literature on them. Notably, where
Peterson and Seligman (2004) had used careful language, the
more recent literature (e.g., Park, 2018) presents the existence of
several of such value-added strengths (approx. 1/4) as a fact. So
far, this striking contradiction to the classifications’ fundamental
principles seems to have been tolerated as a kind of peculiarity,
but if we were to take the criteria seriously, this would necessitate
one of two far-reaching implications: We would have to redefine
or altogether abandon either (1) the criterion or (2) the strengths
in question. It is hence pivotal to examine whether this criterion
applies to all strengths–that “(a)lthough strengths can and do
produce desirable outcomes, each strength is morally valued in
its own right, even in the absence of obvious beneficial outcomes”
(Peterson and Seligman, 2004, p. 19).
Designing a Study to Evaluate Character
Strengths’ Assumed Moral Value
As there is no standard procedure for such an examination,
we have to work with what Peterson and Seligman (2004)
2Ubiquity is recognized as another criterion for character strengths (see Park,
2018). For an overview of the research on this criterion, see Ruch and Stahlmann
(2019).
have provided us with and carefully build our study around
testing what we believe they deemed to be the criterion’s
fundamental qualities. It is clear that they put particular emphasis
on character strengths’ moral integrity in the absence of positive
consequences. Accordingly, we can assert that a proper study
should contrast such scenarios from those in which character
strengths do produce positive consequences–for example, by
experimental manipulation. Other issues leave more room for
interpretation and may result in different design options. From
a psychological perspective, these issues should primarily pertain
to two critical questions: How should we measure character
strengths’ moral evaluation, and whom should we invite to
give their rating? In the following paragraphs, we will describe
how we resolved these issues and how our reasoning guided
our study design.
How Should We Measure Character Strengths’ Moral
Evaluation?
Ignoring the second question for the moment, the most
straightforward way to measure character strengths’ moral
evaluation seems to involve asking individuals directly whether
they believe that traits such as bravery, kindness, and spirituality
are morally valued. A similar approach was used, for example,
by Biswas-Diener (2006) in a study on whether VIA character
strengths are also recognized in less often studied communities,
such as the Kenyan Maasai or Inughuit in Northern Greenland.
However, although efficient, this approach presumably does
not come without a cost to validity and reliability: as every
other trait, character strengths refer to dispositions toward a
range of discrete emotions, behaviors, cognitions, and desires
(see Wilt and Revelle, 2015), and it is not known, but
unlikely, that individuals unanimously share the same cognitive
representations. This is one of the main reasons why items in
personality inventories (including “character inventories,” such
as the VIA Inventory of Strengths; Peterson and Seligman, 2004)
are anchored in specific contexts and situations: standardizing
the frame of reference makes it more likely that participants
are considering the same concepts as the researchers have when
giving their response. Therefore, we concluded that character
strengths’ moral value should be rated indirectly by judging
agents’ actions in multiple well-defined scenarios instead of
providing only one abstract rating per strength. The rating itself
should presumably be given using a bipolar answer format (i.e.,
ranging from immoral [−] to amoral [0] and then to moral
[+]) to avoid steering participants toward artificially-inflated
positive evaluations (e.g., by only allowing participants to rate
how positively morally valued the agents acted). However, as
participants may hence inadvertently feel required to use the
full scale, we also suggest including additional scenarios that
pertain to immoral or amoral actions. Such scenarios may map
onto actions that Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 299) called
“(. . .) talent(s) or abilit(ies) that fall outside the moral realm”
(e.g., general intelligence, athletic ability, or perfect pitch) or
even those that are antithetical to the concept of good character
(e.g., the Dark Triad traits Machiavellianism, narcissism, and
psychopathy; for an overview, see Paulhus and Williams, 2002;
Furnham et al., 2013).
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TABLE 1 | List of character strengths that have previously been discussed as value-added, including all references in the literature and excerpts of the reasoning.




“Persistence is morally valued. We admire the busy bee, the tortoise but not the hare, the little engine that
could, and Rocky Balboa answering the bell again and again (. . .). At the same time, we acknowledge a
downside to diligence when it takes the form of perseveration. Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean reminds us





2009, 2011; Park, 2018
“We hesitate to conclude that enthusiasm per se is morally valued; this judgment will usually follow only
when the activity pursued with enthusiasm is itself moral. However, if life lived well–with vigor and energy–is
a good thing, and of course it is, then perhaps enthusiasm in these terms is morally valued.” (Peterson and
Seligman, 2004, p. 210)
Humor Park et al., 2004a; Park
and Peterson, 2007;
Peterson and Park,
2009, 2011; Park, 2018
“Strengths such as humor and zest are not morally valued in their own right but become morally valued
when coupled with other strengths in the classification. So, a humorous person is simply funny, but a
humorous person who is kind is very special and morally praiseworthy. We call these value-added strengths
and intend to study them further.” (Peterson and Park, 2011, p. 52)
Humility Park et al., 2004b “Perhaps modesty is what we term a value-added strength, not especially satisfying in its own right but–like
humor, for example–important when coupled with other well-developed strengths of character. However,
we tested this possibility by creating all possible product terms between modesty and the other 23
strengths in our classification and found no evidence that these interactions were associated with life






“Although character strengths are generally defined as morally valued traits, several character strengths in
the VIA Classification are positive traits but not moral traits, such as love of learning, curiosity, and
appreciation of beauty.” (Park, 2018, p. 5)
*Love of learning was already marked as potentially value-added by Park and Peterson (2007), although they did not explain this decision.
Whom Should We Invite to Give Their Rating?
In order to resolve the question of whom should judge character
strengths’ moral evaluation, we need to discuss why Peterson
and Seligman (2004) seem to have been so keen on stressing
that character strengths’ moral integrity is untouched by tangible
positive consequences (or the lack thereof). Although they did
not draw an explicit connection (neither in the handbook nor in
later literature), their wording strongly implies that they wanted
to make an argument for the principle of deontology (see Kant,
1785/2007)–or at least against the principle of consequentialism
or utilitarianism (see Mill, 1861/1998): according to Kantian
deontology, an action that produces positive consequences can
never be considered moral if it cannot generalize to a universal
principle of conduct. For example, torture would never be
considered moral, because if everyone would torture to acquire
information, then no one could feel safe and torture would have
to be reliably expected. In contrast, Millian consequentialism
would consider those actions moral that produce more net good
than any alternative actions. In the example above, if torturing
an alleged terrorist would lead to saving the lives of innocent
civilians and there are no alternative actions that yield more
net good, torture could be considered moral. However, this
is where Peterson and Seligman (2004) put their criterion: By
emphasizing that the ends do not sanctify the means but that the
moral value lies in the exercise of character strengths themselves,
they essentially imply that character strengths are deontological
by nature, and that every strength map onto such a universal
principle of conduct.
Indeed, a consequentialist perspective would strongly
challenge the criterion as it stands now (and by extension
also Allport’s differentiation): instead of a characteristic of
the strengths, the moral value would be a characteristic of
their consequences or the contingency between strengths and
consequences. However, this poses a problem because we can
assume that individuals who lean toward consequentialism may
reject character strength’s moral evaluation unless the strengths
account for tangible positive consequences. Moreover, such
individuals could judge character strengths that accidentally
produce negative consequences (irrespective of the actor’s good
intentions) as negatively morally valued. Even individuals who
lean toward deontology may not necessarily judge character
strengths as positively morally valued because they may not
believe that the strengths can generalize to universal principles of
conduct. In this sense, Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) criterion
is as much a set of assumptions about character strengths as
it is about ethical decision making in general, and thus the
question of whom to invite to give their rating quickly becomes
a question of defining moral value as a whole–and as several
studies have shown that individuals differ in their inclinations
toward deontology and consequentialism (see, e.g., Tanner et al.,
2008; Conway and Gawronski, 2013), this may be the most
important predictor of whether character strengths will pass or
fail the criterion.
To make matters even more complicated, the relevant
literature has long abandoned the purely rationalist perspective
on ethical decision making that was prevalent in the late 20th
century (see, e.g., Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). More contemporary
models, such as Greene’s dual-process theory (see, e.g.,
Greene, 2007; Conway and Gawronski, 2013), rather stress
the importance of immediate affective reactions, available
cognitive resources, and motivation, that may or may not enable
rationalist processing. If emotions such as happiness, sadness,
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and anger (Gawronski et al., 2018) or other factors such as time
pressure (Gawronski and Beer, 2017) or even emotion-related
damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Greene, 2007) can
influence ethical decision making, it becomes not only a question
of whom to invite but also of when to invite them. This also raises
the question whether individual differences in trait character
strengths–such as the endorsement of bravery or kindness–can
influence affective responses and cognitive processing in a similar
fashion: for example, a certain degree of perceived similarity
between actor and judge may lead to more positive evaluations
(“It takes one to know one”).
Altogether, these considerations emphasize that Peterson
and Seligman’s (2004) criterion can only be met if a set of
specific assumptions about the judges’ processing of strength-
related actions can be met as well: specifically, this would only
be possible if character strengths’ moral value were not only
independent of tangible positive outcomes but also of individual
differences in ethical decision making that map equally well
onto inclinations toward deontology and consequentialism and
intuitive, affective heuristics. Ideally, we can hope that our
account pushes toward more research that addresses all of
these potential factors in dedicated studies–either by actively
manipulating or by controlling them. For now, we can only
lay the groundwork by investigating whether Peterson and
Seligman’s (2004) criterion can still hold–notwithstanding all the
factors that seem to challenge its validity. To do so, we decided
to unselectively invite individuals whom we recruited from
the general population to give their rating–this should include
individuals with diverse ethical inclinations and in various
affective, cognitive, and motivational states. However, we did
decide to additionally measure inclinations toward deontology
and consequentialism as these seem to have been so significant
for Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) reasoning. We also decided
to measure trait character strengths because they constitute the
conceptually closest other factors that could constitute differences
in moral evaluations.
Aims of This Study
Based on our considerations above, we took the first step
toward systematically investigating character strengths moral
value by designing an online experiment that is explicitly
aimed at measuring individuals’ moral evaluation of fictional
agents’ strength-related behavior. First, we tested whether
Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) claim was correct in that every
strength is generally recognized as positively morally valued,
even in the absence of positive consequences. Second, we
tested whether mixed (positive and negative) and negative
consequences can affect participants’ evaluations and translated
individual response patterns into scores that map onto their
inclinations toward deontology and consequentialism. Third,
we tested whether these inclinations and individual differences
in trait character strengths are connected with individuals’
moral evaluations. Following up on our theoretical reasoning,
our study provides first evidence of whether the criterion
is meaningful, whether it can be met by all strengths, and




This study used a convenience sample comprising N = 230
participants (80.00% female, 20.00% male; Mage = 25.01,
SDage = 6.25, range = 18–45 years). The majority were
Germans (56.52%), Swiss (27.83%), German-speaking Italians
from South Tyrol (5.22%), and Austrians (4.34%). About three
quarters were college or university students (78.26%) who had
received upper secondary education (undergraduate: 74.44%) or
tertiary education (graduate: 25.56%). The remainder had largely
received tertiary education (Bachelor or higher: 85.71%) or upper
secondary education (14.29%).
The experiment was administered online via
www.soscisurvey.de in January and February 2020. Participants
had to be at least 18 years old and fluent in German. They
provided informed consent before participation, began by
providing demographic data, and subsequently worked on the
VIA-IS and the CS-MET. They were debriefed after participation
and received partial course credit upon request. The experiment
took participants approximately 1 h to complete.
Measures
Character Strengths’ Moral Evaluation
We created the Character Strengths’ Moral Evaluation Task (CS-
MET) to assess the VIA character strengths’ moral evaluation.
The CS-MET’s basic building blocks are 108 ultra-short
stories: 96 character-related stories and 12 anchor-stories (four
stories per character strength/anchor). Every story can be
presented independently or be paired with three story-specific
“sequels” to produce four different trial types: (1) stories
without consequences, (2) stories with positive consequences, (3)
stories with mixed consequences, and (4) stories with negative
consequences, for a total of 4 × 108 = 432 possible trials (within-
subjects design). In every trial, we inquired participants to rate
the degree to which they believe that the stories’ agents acted
morally correct using a nine-point answer format (anchored at
−5 = [they acted] very much morally negatively, 0 = [they acted]
neutrally, and +5 = [they acted] very much morally positively).
Anchors were the three socially aversive traits of the Dark Triad:
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (for an overview,
see Paulhus and Williams, 2002; Furnham et al., 2013). The CS-
MET (in German) can be found in the CS-MET repository on
OSF: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/ZGTXQ.
Stimuli
Every ultra-short story depicts a different agent engaging in
behavior that corresponds to the underlying character strength
or Dark Triad trait. Three translated examples are: “A young
woman courageously confronts her fear of heights and valiantly
scales a climbing wall for the first time in her life” (bravery),
“A high school student compassionately tends to his grandfather
and assists him with his daily routine” (kindness), and “A young
employee has big career goals and is ruthless in achieving them”
(Machiavellianism). Notably, expressions such as “high school
student” and “young employee” are gender-neutral in English
but require specification in German, and hence we assigned half
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of the agents per strength/Dark Triad trait as female and the
other half as male. We likewise diversified the agents’ age per
strength/Dark Triad trait by depicting them as either primary
or secondary schoolers (6–18 years), young adults (19–34 years),
adults (35–64 years), or older adults (more than 65 years). We
crafted the stories vis-à-vis the literature and instruments for
measuring character strengths and the Dark Triad using Peterson
and Seligman’s (2004) handbook, the German VIA-IS’ items (see
Ruch et al., 2010), and the German Short Dark Triad’s and Dirty
Dozen’s items (see Küfner et al., 2015; Malesza et al., 2019).
The story-specific sequels pertain to either positive, mixed, or
negative consequences following the agents’ actions. Translated
examples for the previously depicted story on kindness are “The
student is cherished by his grandfather and is bequeathed a
large portion of his patrimony” (positive), “The student feels
appreciated, but tending to his grandfather sometimes keeps him
very busy, and he has trouble with his coursework” (mixed),
and “The student has an accident while carrying the groceries
and has to use crutches for the next 4 weeks” (negative). Half of
the sequel stories per strength pertained to consequences for the
actors themselves (such as in the examples), while the other half
pertained to consequences for others.
Pretests and data preparation
Four members of the positive psychology research group at the
(University of Zurich) pretested the CS-MET: they provided
feedback on the stories’ clarity, whether they did indeed pertain
to the character strength/Dark Triad trait in question, and
whether they may unintentionally touch on more than one
strength/Dark Triad trait, and we amended some of the stories
accordingly3. In every story that pertained to character strengths,
the experts rated the agent’s actions as at least marginally morally
positive (Min = +1). Overall, the expert ratings ranged from 1.23
(creativity) to 3.88 (fairness) with Mdn = 1.88. Next to fairness,
the other top five strengths were kindness (3.38), honesty (3.13),
and judgment and gratitude (both 3.00).
Additionally, two student assistants completed the full CS-
MET and provided feedback on their experience and the elapsed
time. They stated that the instructions were clear and that
they could readily rate all stories, but that the CS-MET alone
took them more than 1 h to complete, which strained their
vigilance and motivation. Accordingly, we decided to decrease
the individual burden by inquiring participants to only work
on a randomly selected portion of the CS-MET’s trials. This
approach corresponds to Revelle et al. (2017) SAPA procedure,
who showed that data that includes procedurally missing values
(missing completely at random; MCAR) can still produce reliable
mean-level statistics without the need to present the whole item
set. We hence sampled eight strengths and one Dark Triad trait
completely at random for a total of 9 (strengths/Dark Triad
trait) × 4 (stories) × 4 (trial types) = 144 trials for every
participant. In other words, every participant rated stories that
3An example for such an amended story for perseverance is: “A student assistant
shows his persistence and tenacity by continuing to work while others have already
resigned.” The original story was flagged for additionally touching on kindness:
“A student assistant shows his persistence and tenacity by trying to manage his
coworkers’ tasks while they have already resigned”.
correspond to eight strengths and one Dark Triad trait across all
four trial types. In order to further avoid the loss of vigilance
and motivation, we administered the CS-MET in two blocks: In
the first block, participants appraised their preselected 36 stories
without consequences, and in the second block, they appraised
the 108 stories with consequences. The trials were randomized
within both blocks, and participants could take two breaks: one
after the first block and another one after appraising half of the
trials of the second block.
For every trial type, participants’ ratings were aggregated
across the corresponding four stories, resulting in 9
(strengths/Dark Triad trait) × 4 (trial types) = 36 ratings
per participant. The ratings were subsequently aggregated across
participants to obtain sample means, standard deviations, and
95% confidence intervals (with Bonferroni correction) of the
means for every strength/Dark Triad trait. In the final sample, the
stories’ Cronbach’s alpha per character strength ranged from 0.54
(Prudence) to 0.84 (Curiosity) with amedian internal consistency
of 0.75, and the Dark Triad traits’ Cronbach’s alphas were 0.64
(Machiavellianism), 0.61 (narcissism), and 0.65 (psychopathy).
Character Strengths
We used the VIA Inventory of Strengths [VIA-IS: Peterson
and Seligman, 2004; German adaptation by Ruch et al. (2010)]
to assess the VIA classification’s 24 character strengths (e.g.,
judgment: “I always examine both sides of an issue”). The VIA-
IS formally comprises 240 items (10 items per strength) and
uses a five-point answer format (1 = very much unlike me to
5 = very much like me). We also used Revelle et al.s’ (2017) SAPA
procedure and sampled 120 items completely at random for every
participant. We presented these items in four blocks that each
comprised 30 items. In this study, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from
0.60 (Teamwork) to 0.90 (Spirituality) with a median internal
consistency of 0.78.
Data Analysis
We conducted the analyses within the R statistical computing
environment (R Core Team, 2019) using Revelle’s (2019)
psych package. As we did not formulate hypotheses about the
interaction of particular character strengths’ moral evaluations
with different consequences following strength-related behavior,
we only inspected the corresponding main effects. However,
the results of a 27 (character strengths + Dark Triad
traits) × 4 (consequences) repeated measures ANOVA/mixed-
effects analysis can still be found in the Supplementary Knitr
report (see Xie, 2020) to this publication, as can be the input and
output of our analyses in general.
In correspondence to Peterson and Seligman’s (2004)
criterion, we considered the aggregated ratings for stories
without consequences to depict the general moral evaluation of
character strengths (“even in the absence of obvious beneficial
outcomes”, p. 19). We began by describing our findings for this
general moral evaluation and contrasted it from that for stories
with positive consequences. Next, we inspected the aggregated
ratings for stories with mixed and negative consequences and
used Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) process dissociation
approach to compute inclinations toward deontology and
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consequentialism. Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) approach is
based on Greene’s (e.g., 2007) dual-process theory and allows for
computing separate scores for both inclinations by contrasting
evaluations in “congruent” scenarios (in which both inclinations
produce similar ratings; this should correspond to stories with
positive consequences) from those in “incongruent” scenarios (in
which both inclinations produce opposing ratings; this should
correspond to stories with negative consequences). Finally, we
examined the relationships of the general moral evaluation with
the resulting scores and with character strengths using regression
and correlation analysis.
RESULTS
Participants Generally Recognize Every
Strength as Positively Morally Valued,
Even in the Absence of Positive
Outcomes
The CS-MET’s overall results are depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1A
shows that participants generally recognized every character
strength as positively morally valued when the stories were
presented without consequences. Conversely, the three Dark
Triad traits were generally perceived as negatively morally valued,
which can be considered a successful manipulation check. All
ratings were significantly different from zero (neutral), but there
were notable differences in the effect sizes4. We assigned them to
one of four tiers according to which thresholds of the scale were
or were not entailed by their confidence intervals. Five strengths
were rated higher than +2 and were labeled very positive:
Judgment, honesty, kindness, fairness, and hope. Remarkably,
these strengths (except for hope) correspond to the top five
strengths that have been identified by the small sample of experts
in the pretest. Eight strengths entailed +2 and were labeled
markedly positive: Bravery, love, social intelligence, teamwork,
leadership, humility, gratitude, and humor. Two strengths were
rated higher than +1 and were labeled positive: Curiosity and
prudence. Nine strengths entailed +1 and were labeled slightly
positive: Creativity, love of learning, perspective, perseverance,
zest, forgiveness, self-regulation, appreciation of beauty, and
spirituality. Notably, four strengths that have previously been
discussed as value-added were rated slightly positive (love of
learning, perseverance, zest, and appreciation of beauty), one was
rated positive (curiosity), and two were rated markedly positive
(humility and humor).
Figure 1B shows that positive consequences following the
agents’ actions resulted in a similar pattern and only marginal
changes to the average evaluation: the profile correlation was
rAB = 0.99, and hence the strengths’ rank order can be
considered practically equivalent. The average evaluations were
also comparable with MA = 1.81, 95% CI [1.52, 2.09] and
MB = 1.99, 95% CI [1.82, 2.16], which indicates that positive
consequences generally did not yield more positive evaluations.
4These findings generally apply to both character strengths and Dark Triad
traits, but in line with this study’s aims, the statistics described in the following
paragraphs only involve character strengths.
We concluded that every strength satisfied Peterson and
Seligman’s (2004) criterion: Every strength was positively morally
valued, and positive consequences did neither account for nor
increase this effect by a notable degree. However, there were
differences in moral evaluations across strengths, which indicates
that some strengths are valued more strongly than others.
Different Consequences Following
Strength-Related Behavior Influence
Moral Evaluations and Indicate
Differences in Inclinations Toward
Deontology and Consequentialism
The other panels show that mixed (Figure 1C) and negative
(Figure 1D) consequences following the agents’ actions also
resulted in similar patterns, but in more changes to the
average evaluations: the profile correlations were rAC = 0.95,
and rAD = 0.92, but participants generally rated the agents’
actions less positively when they were followed by mixed
consequences (MC = 0.90, 95% CI [0.66, 1.13]) and the least
positively when they were followed by negative consequences
(MD = 0.29, 95% CI [0.04, 0.55]): In trials with mixed
consequences, participants rated two previously slightly positive
strengths neutrally (perseverance and appreciation of beauty).
In trials with negative consequences, participants rated 13
previously slightly positive to markedly positive strengths
neutrally (creativity, curiosity, love of learning, perspective,
zest, teamwork, leadership, forgiveness, humility, self-regulation,
appreciation of beauty, humor, and spirituality) and two
strengths negatively (perseverance and love). These include all
strengths that have previously been discussed as value-added.
Based on Conway andGawronski’s (2013) process dissociation
approach, we computed participants’ deontological and
consequentialist inclinations by contrasting their ratings in
stories with positive consequences and such with negative
consequences. In the language of process dissociation, stories
with positive consequences should map onto congruent trials
because both deontological and consequentialist inclinations
should result in positive moral evaluations (assuming that
there is indeed some deontological value attached to character
strengths). Conversely, stories with negative consequences
should map onto incongruent trials because deontological
inclinations should result in positive moral evaluations, whereas
consequentialist inclinations should result in negative moral
evaluations. Notably, our data structure differed from that
of Conway and Gawronski (2013) in that participants did
not just choose but additionally rated the degree to which the
action depicted in the stories was acceptable or unacceptable.
Accordingly, we did not compute the percentages of acquiescence
but substituted the “raw” moral evaluations into the formulas5
to obtaining the process dissociation scores (PDS) of deontology
5Following Conway and Gawronski (2013, pp. 219–220), our formulas
were: PDS consequentialism = mean moral evaluation in trials with positive
consequences – mean moral evaluation in trials with negative consequences and PDS
deontology = mean moral evaluation in trials with negative consequences/(1 − PDS
consequentialism). Our calculations can also be found in the Supplementary Knitr
document to this publication.
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FIGURE 1 | Means and 95% confidence intervals (with Bonferroni correction) of the Character Strengths’ Moral Evaluation Task’s (CS-MET) ratings as functions of
the 24 VIA character strengths and the three Dark Triad traits. The panels depict the ratings for the different trial types: (A) stories without consequences, (B) stories
with positive consequences, (C) stories with mixed consequences, and (D) stories with negative consequences. N = 230.
and consequentialism. However, we normed the ratings to the
range of [0, 1] to make our PDS more comparable to those
of Conway and Gawronski (2013). A histogram of the PDS is
depicted in Figure 2A. It shows that participants differed in their
inclinations toward deontology and consequentialism, which
corresponds to our observation that the average evaluations in
trials with mixed and negative consequences were smaller than
those in trials with positive or no consequences. We concluded
that different consequences following strength-related behavior
can influence moral evaluations and that differences in the
ratings correspond to differences in the inclinations toward
deontology and consequentialism.
Inclinations Toward Deontology and
Consequentialism and Individual
Differences in Character Strengths
Influence Moral Evaluations
Figure 2B shows the results of a regression model that included
PDS deontology, PDS consequentialism, and their interaction
as predictors and the mean moral evaluation in stories without
consequences as criterion. Surprisingly, both PDS deontology
[b = 5.39, t(226) = 12.43, p < 0.001] and PDS consequentialism
[b = 4.87, t(226) = 4.56, p < 0.001] emerged as significant
predictors, and their significant negative interaction [b = −5.11,
t(226) = −3.56, p < 0.001] indicates that they compensate
each other at high levels. Taken together, all predictors
can explain the share of R2Adjusted = 0.60. We concluded
that–unlike in trials with mixed and negative consequences–
inclinations toward deontology and consequentialism can
account for more positive evaluations in the absence of tangible
outcomes. This result suggests that character strengths’ moral
value is indeed, for the most part, unanimously recognized
as long as the consequences of strength-related actions
are unmentioned.
Finally, Table 2 shows that individual differences in eight
strengths–as measured by the VIA-IS–correlated with more
positive ratings in the CS-MET’s respective strength-related
stories: for example, individuals who endorsed zest in the
VIA-IS also rated it more positively in the CS-MET’s stories
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Histograms of process dissociation scores (PDS) for consequentialism and deontology. (B) Results of the linear regression analysis of the PDS on
the mean moral evaluation in the Character Strength’s Moral Evaluation Task’s (CS-MET) stories without consequences: Mean moral
evaluation = –2.15 + 4.87 × PDS consequentialism + 5.39 × PDS deontology – 5.11 × PDS consequentialism × PDS deontology. R2Adjusted = 0.60; N = 230.
with mixed and negative consequences (small to medium
positive effects). Further differences pertained to small to
medium positive effects for social intelligence (no/positive
consequences), fairness (mixed/negative consequences),
leadership (no/positive/mixed consequences), humility
(no/positive consequences), gratitude (no/positive/mixed
consequences), and humor (no consequences), and to medium to
large positive effects for spirituality (no/positive consequences).
These include three strengths that have previously been
discussed as value-added (zest, humility, and humor). Notably,
there were no differences pertaining to very positive strengths.
We concluded that individual differences in trait character
strengths can also influence moral evaluations, but that this effect
may not apply to all strengths.
DISCUSSION
This account set out to highlight the importance of scrutinizing
the criteria for character strengths, and our study sought to
take the first step toward empirically testing one of the most
defining yet understudied criteria–morally valued–in an online
experiment. Based on the responses of a German-speaking
convenience sample, we can indeed offer first evidence that
“(a)lthough strengths can and do produce desirable outcomes,
each strength is morally valued in its own right, even in
the absence of obvious beneficial outcomes” (Peterson and
Seligman, 2004, p. 19). This is arguably the most important
result of our study, and it can therefore not be understated
that the criterion seems to stand–notwithstanding prior
ideas about value-added strengths and individual differences
in ethical decision making. However, although our results
emphasize the criterion’s validity, they also demonstrate that
our previous understanding was oversimplified: character
strengths moral evaluation seems to come in degrees, and
it can be affected by at least three (and presumably several
more) critical factors: The character strengths themselves,
their consequences, and also individual differences in
inclinations toward deontology and consequentialism and
in character strengths.
Most notably, participants valued some strengths more
strongly than others. In particular, judgment, honesty, kindness,
fairness, and hope constituted the highest-valued strengths, and
although it was diminished, their positive value could mostly
stand even in the face of negative consequences. On the other
hand, creativity, love of learning, perspective, perseverance, and
zest (among others) were among the lowest-rated strengths,
and it is striking that many of them were previously discussed
as value-added. Second, mixed (positive and negative) and
negative consequences generally accounted for less positive
and, in some cases, also for negative evaluations, such as
in the case of perseverance and love. Using Conway and
Gawronski’s (2013) process dissociation approach, we were
able to connect differences in the ratings to differences in
inclinations toward deontology and consequentialism, which
were prevalent and widely spread in the sample. To our
surprise, both inclinations, including consequentialism (and
their interaction), proved to be strong predictors of character
strengths’ moral evaluation in the absence of tangible outcomes.
This finding can explain why the criterion can stand in an
ethically diversified sample, but it also raises the new question
of how individuals who put a strong emphasis on positive
consequences can arrive at positive evaluations when there are
no such consequences. Finally, individual differences in character
strengths seem also to affect moral evaluations, but this effect
only pertained to specific strengths and only in the face of
specific consequences: For example, individuals who endorsed
spirituality arrived at much more positive evaluations in trials
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TABLE 2 | Correlations of character strengths (as measured by the VIA-IS) with











Creativity 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.03
Curiosity 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.02
Judgment 0.01 0.06 −0.07 −0.03
Love of
learning
0.03 −0.21 0.11 0.22
Perspective 0.18 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02
Bravery 0.03 0.11 0.03 −0.07
Perseverance 0.11 −0.01 −0.11 −0.15
Honesty 0.05 −0.09 −0.06 −0.19
Zest 0.24 0.18 0.26* 0.28*
Love 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.09
Kindness 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.03
Social
intelligence
0.24* 0.26* 0.10 0.09
Teamwork 0.16 0.19 0.06 0.00
Fairness 0.20 0.14 0.32** 0.24*
Leadership 0.28** 0.30** 0.30** 0.11
Forgiveness 0.15 0.06 0.21 0.20
Humility 0.26* 0.25* 0.17 0.00
Prudence 0.14 −0.08 −0.10 −0.10
Self-
regulation
0.04 −0.08 0.07 0.10
Appreciation
of beauty
0.07 0.21 −0.02 −0.14
Gratitude 0.28* 0.26* 0.28* 0.20
Hope 0.16 0.07 −0.01 −0.09
Humor 0.28** −0.05 0.06 0.09
Spirituality 0.44*** 0.34** 0.18 0.09
N = 230; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
with positive and no consequences, and the same was true
for individuals who endorsed fairness in trials with mixed and
negative outcomes.
Our account demonstrates that reinstalling research into the
criteria is useful because it contributes to substantiating character
strengths’ theoretical foundation, thus helping us understand
what character is. However, it also highlights that working
with the criteria produces many more questions that require
further attention. Regarding morally valued, these questions
primarily pertain to why some strengths are valued more
positively than others, how consequentialism can lead to more
positive evaluations in the absence of tangible outcomes, and–
maybe most importantly–where we now want to go and how
to proceed from here. As our solution to the first problem
hinges on the second one, we will begin by explaining why
we believe that consequentialism can yield more positive
evaluations in the absence of positive outcomes and address
the remaining questions after that. However, it is important to
note that more theoretical discussion and empirical research
will be needed to answer these questions definitively, and we
can hence only provide careful and preliminary explanations
to our findings.
Consequentialism Accounts for More
Positive Evaluations Because of an
Assumed Connection of Character
Strengths With Positive Consequences
As we have stated in the introduction to our account, there is an
abundance of studies into character strengths’ positive outcomes,
such as well-being (e.g., Park et al., 2004a; Wagner et al., 2019),
work performance and academic achievement (e.g., Park and
Peterson, 2006; Littman-Ovadia and Lavy, 2016), and resilience
(e.g., Peterson et al., 2006; Martínez-Martí and Ruch, 2017).
We can now look back on more than 15 years of research into
such positive outcomes, and additionally on even more years
of research into specific strengths, such as kindness/prosocial
behavior (e.g., Batson, 2012) and hope/optimism (e.g., Snyder
et al., 2005). Beyond systematic investigations and their
presumable influence on laypersons’ understanding of character,
we can assume that personal experiences, contemporary media,
and folkloric knowledge (among other factors) will have
engendered the stereotype that character accounts for positive
consequences–at least until you are convinced otherwise. Indeed,
studies such as Biswas-Diener’s (2006) into the recognition
and desirability of character strengths among the Kenyan
Maasai or Inughuit in Northern Greenland, or more recent
studies by Ruch et al. (2019) and Giuliani et al. (2020) into
their perceived fulfillment and virtuousness demonstrate that
individuals strongly connect character strengths with such
positive outcomes. Accordingly, we can assume that participants
who were driven by consequentialism valued character strengths
more positively because they assumed them to account for some
positive consequences. In other words, they may have believed
that positive consequences were implied even when they were
not mentioned in the story. Indeed, this explanation can fit well
into Greene’s (e.g., 2007) dual-process theory of moral judgment
because participants seem to have relied more on spontaneous
intuitions than on rational processing when giving their rating–
else the principle of consequentialism would have dictated to
reject character strengths’ moral value. However, it also raises
the question whether, under other circumstances, for example
when given abundant time and resources (see Conway and
Gawronski, 2013; Gawronski and Beer, 2017), individuals would
arrive at different judgments, thus again challenging the validity
of Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) criterion.
Irrespective of this question, the considerations above suggest
that the criterion’s current wording is slightly misleading:
although deontologists may subscribe to the notion that character
strengths are morally valued “(. . .) in the absence of obvious
beneficial outcomes” (Peterson and Seligman, 2004, p. 19),
consequentialists would certainly not. They would either assume
that there is some implicit connection with positive outcomes–
which seems to be the case in our sample–or they would
not and thus reject the criterion. In any case, the connection
with such outcomes is critical, and although it may not be
immediately obvious to the judges themselves, its pertinent role
in this explanation makes it obvious to the observer. It would
undoubtedly be too early to revise the criterion based on only
one study, but we hope that our account can animate more
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discussion into this issue and spawn new empirical studies
that test our or similar hypotheses. To this end, we believe
that either of two approaches may prove to be especially
fruitful: Experimentally priming the connection of character
strengths and positive outcomes before administering the CS-
MET or using cognitive interviewing (see, e.g., Beatty and
Willis, 2007) during administration. For example, a simple
experimental design could involve attempting to manipulate
this connection by providing some participants with a popular
review on character strengths’ positive outcomes. In contrast,
the remainder would be provided with a review on the “dark
side” of character strengths, such as strength underuse, overuse,
and their correlations with psychopathology (see Freidlin et al.,
2017; Littman-Ovadia and Freidlin, 2020). If the manipulation
was successful, this could result in the first group rating
character strengths generally more positively than the second
group, which would support our hypothesis. On the other
hand, cognitive interviewing could involve inquiring participants
(especially those with inclinations toward consequentialism) to
explain how they arrived at their specific judgments at the
moment they are giving it. This would require participants
to be able to have some cognitive access to their processing–
which may or may not be the case–but it could result in
more unbiased findings that either substantiate, extend, or
challenge our hypothesis.
Why Are Some Strengths Valued More
Positively Than Others?
Some Strengths Are Valued More Positively Because
of an Assumed Stronger Connection With Positive
Outcomes
Following our considerations on how consequentialism and
deontology may have driven participants’ moral evaluations, we
can offer two tentative explanations on why some strengths were
consistently valued more positively than others, and how the
concept of value-added strengths may fit into this picture. First, if
our hypothesis was correct and consequentialists generally valued
character strengths due to their assumed connection with positive
outcomes, strengths that sustain stronger connections and those
that produce more or more important positive outcomes might
also yield more positive evaluations. Indeed, this hypothesis
is supported by findings on strengths such as hope, which
typically yields stronger relationships with well-being than most
other strengths (e.g., Park et al., 2004a; Wagner et al., 2019) or
bravery, which emerged as one of the most potent correlates
of resilience (e.g., Peterson et al., 2006; Martínez-Martí and
Ruch, 2017). However, there are also several findings that seem
to contradict this hypothesis, such as those on perseverance,
which was among the lowest-rated strengths but also among the
strongest correlates of performance and academic achievement
(e.g., Park and Peterson, 2006; Littman-Ovadia and Lavy, 2016).
Overall, there is only selective overlap between our results
and those reported in the literature, and as long as we do
not have reason to suspect that we are looking at the wrong
outcomes, our hypothesis can only apply if character strengths’
moral value hinges more strongly on the assumed qualities
of the connection than on the qualities that we can find in
correlational studies.
This would make the experimental design that we have
outlined above even more interesting: Instead of priming
character strengths’ connection with positive outcomes in
general, we could attempt to prime only some selected strengths’
connection and explore whether this also leads to more positive
evaluations in the targeted strengths (but not in those that
were untargeted). Alternatively, we may investigate whether
an individual’s knowledge of research findings into character
strengths’ specific connections with positive outcomes can
strengthen the match between these findings and their ratings.
Taken together, it is plausible that the assumed connection
between strengths and positive outcomes not only affects whether
but also the degree to which consequentialists perceive character
strengths as positively morally valued. In this framework, value-
added strengths would correspond to those that are believed to
sustain the weakest or the smallest number of connections with
important positive outcomes. In this sense, it may be better to
speak of value-at-risk strengths, as their model value may fail to be
recognized if there are occasional negative outcomes. However,
due to the incongruence between the literature and our findings,
and assuming that educated individuals (such as in our sample)
may have a fair understanding of character strengths’ connection
with positive outcomes (e.g., that perseverance can contribute
to performance) we are inclined to believe that this hypothesis
has only little bearing on the ratings. Instead, we believe that the
following, deontologically grounded hypothesis, primarily drives
individuals’ judgments.
Some Strengths Are Valued More Positively Because
of an Assumed Better Qualification for Universal
Principles of Conduct
Earlier, we raised the idea that Peterson and Seligman (2004)
may have put particular emphasis on character strengths’ moral
integrity in the absence of positive outcomes because they
wanted to make an argument for the principle of deontology.
This principle can essentially be defined by Kant’s (1785/2007)
categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim
whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should
become a universal law.” Consequently, if individuals’ moral
evaluations are driven by deontology, and they arrive at very
positive evaluations, their evaluations should map onto character
strengths’ qualifications for such universal principles of conduct.
In other words, individuals who arrive at particularly positive
ratings for specific character strengths may believe that the
actions associated with these strengths can universalize across
a number–if not the majority–of different scenarios in which
they can find themselves in. For example, as participants have
assigned very positive evaluations to judgment and honesty,
they may believe that it would be best if they would always act
with practical wisdom, considering all facets and perspectives
when attempting to make a decision and to always be honest
toward themselves and others. In contrast, as creativity and zest
were rated considerably less positive, participants may believe
that they can usually let their creativity flow and approach life
enthusiastically, but that there is also a number of situations
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in which such actions would be ill-advised. Remarkably, this
would make the VIA classification not only a catalog of human
strengths but–presumably by coincidence–also one of such
deontological principles.
This is undoubtedly a bold claim, and due to its potential
theoretical repercussions, it will require sensitive discussion and
strong empirical substantiation. Most notably, and in line with
Greene’s dual-process model (e.g., Greene, 2007; Conway and
Gawronski, 2013), we can assume that many individuals will not
reason in the strictest sense but instead resort to stereotypes when
rating character strengths’ moral value: They may not ponder
on character strengths’ qualification to universalize inasmuch as
they decide according to their affective responses and intuitions.
Still, it is possible that character strengths’ “universalizability”
may sensibly shape such stereotypes, be it by positive individual
experiences, cultural norms, or even by what Peterson and
Seligman (2004, p. 13) call “an evolutionary process that selected
for these aspects of excellence as means of solving the important
tasks necessary for survival of the species”. Taken together, it
may be the degree to which character strengths qualify for
general principles of conduct that explains which strengths are
particularly valued by deontologists. In this framework, value-
added strengths would correspond to those that are believed
to qualify as guiding principles only for a lesser number of
scenarios in which individuals can find themselves in. We may
speculate that it was this lack of universalizability (“positively
valued, but only under specific circumstances”) that led other
researchers to believe that such value-added strengths can exist.
Future studies may choose to inquire participants whether they
believe that specific strengths can universalize to such principles
and correlate their responses with their ratings in the CS-MET.
However, as it is unclear to what extent individuals can reason
about their decision, this may or may not yield conclusive
findings. Above all else, we believe that this hypothesis demands
theoretical attention, especially the joint efforts from psychology
and philosophy, to develop a model that can conceptually
unify our findings.
Limitations
This study’s results and inferences are subject to a number
of limitations that primarily pertain to the characteristics of
our sample and our experimental design. First, we chose to
recruit a convenience sample to test whether Peterson and
Seligman’s (2004) criterion can stand in the face of diverse
ethical inclinations and differences in affective, cognitive, and
motivational states. The variance in the process dissociation
scores of deontology and consequentialism implies that we were
able to recruit such an ethically diverse sample, but we have
not collected information about participants’ affective, cognitive,
and motivational states. Specifically, we have not collected
information about their ability and motivation to engage in
ethical reasoning prior to giving their ratings instead of resorting
to heuristics and stereotypes. It is hence unclear to what extent
inclinations toward deontology and consequentialism were the
product of such reasoning or of rather intuitive, automatic
processing (see Greene, 2007; Conway and Gawronski, 2013).
A related issue is that our only indicator of the CS-MET’s
reliability are the stories’ internal consistencies and that we have
not collected data on the ratings’ stability. It is hence unclear
whether participants would arrive at the same ratings when
questioned again and whether supposed fluctuations should be
considered a characteristic of a lack of reliability or of differences
in participants’ processing. In any case, the CS-MET’s reliability
and what variation in the ratings means should be subject to
further discussion and scrutiny. Moreover, our sample mainly
comprised relatively young, female individuals who were highly
educated and were presumably raised in a WEIRD society (see
Henrich et al., 2010). We hope that our account can spawn
more interest in scrutinizing the criteria–particularly morally
valued–and that our experimental approach will be adopted
in a study that recruits their sample from a different cultural
background. This would also contribute to testing our findings’
cultural invariance: specifically, if character strengths proved to
map onto general deontological principles, we would hope that
future research would also explore whether such principles can
universalize across cultures in a fashion that corresponds to
character strengths’ criterion of ubiquity (see Park, 2018).
Second, it cannot be ruled out that our findings were partially
produced by our experimental design and thus rather reflect
methodological issues instead of differences in moral evaluations.
The within-subjects design allowed participants to indirectly
rate the same strengths across different trials, but it may have
also introduced artificial variance due to this sequencing. For
example, stories with negative consequences may have been
perceived as much more negative in comparison to stories with
positive or no consequences, thus accounting for bias in moral
evaluations. We used the three socially aversive traits of the Dark
Triad in order to avoid that participants feel required to produce
variance in their ratings. However, this may have also accounted
for stronger distinctions between evaluations of such traits and
those of character strengths. Future research may choose to use
instead what Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 299) called “(. . .)
talent(s) or abilit(ies) that fall outside the moral realm” (e.g.,
general intelligence, athletic ability, or perfect pitch) as anchors.
However, we suggest not using personality traits such as the
Big Five: Such traits will presumably also be positively morally
valued because they conceptually include many character-related
traits. This can be seen in Allport and Odbert’s (1936, pp. 38–
171) adjective lists, which also include terms such as “honest,”
“humorous,” and “modest,” and in McGrath et al.’s (2020) study
into the overlap between the VIA classification, the Big Five, and
the HEXACOmodel.
Third, it is unclear whether a certain degree of social
desirabilitymay have influenced participants’ ratings. Specifically,
it may be assumed that participants rated certain character
strengths more positively because they thought that this
was expected from them and not because they themselves
believed that the strengths hold inherent moral value. As
the experiment was administered online and participants
submitted their ratings anonymously, we do not believe that
they felt particularly required to respond according to such
norms. However, previous research using the American English
(Peterson and Seligman, 2004) and the German (Ruch et al.,
2010) VIA-IS showed that some strengths were significantly
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(albeit weakly) associated with measures of social desirability
(e.g., prudence, honesty, humility in a German-speaking sample).
Accordingly, future research may choose to test whether such
effects can also be found in the CS-MET and–if they could
be found–what would make participants feel required to
modify their ratings.
Finally, as stories were initially presented without
consequences, and participants were not explicitly alluded to
the experimental design, they may not have considered that
the agents’ actions could also produce negative consequences.
Indeed, our stories may be criticized for not only implicitly
but also explicitly stating that the agents’ actions accounted for
some positive consequences. In our exemplary story for bravery–
“A young woman courageously confronts her fear of heights
and valiantly scales a climbing wall for the first time in her
life”–successfully scaling a climbing wall could be perceived as
a positive consequence in itself. This is a conceptual problem
because character strengths and such inherent consequences
cannot be split without stripping the strength of its meaning.
For example, Peterson and Seligman’s (2004, p. 29) consensual
definition of bravery entails “(. . .) speaking up for what is right
even if there is opposition (. . .)”, and speaking up may or may
not already be perceived as such a positive consequence (e.g., of
overcoming fear). It can be assumed that there are individual
differences in the degree to which participants expected further
consequences or noticed that this might not be the end of
the story, and such differences may have also biased our
results. Future research may choose to allude participants to the
experimental design and explain that they will first rate scenarios
without consequences, followed by scenarios with consequences,
but this might arguably also account for greater differences
between these two blocks.
CONCLUSION
This account shows that scrutinizing the criteria for character
strengths is useful because it helps us understand what character
is and what sets it apart from other individual differences.
Presumably, most readers were familiar with the criteria and
had “nodded them off,” but we suspect that few would have
subscribed to the notion that character strengths may qualify
for deontological principles of conduct or that their moral
value may also be grounded in their implicit connection
with positive outcomes. Our study focused on character
strengths’ assumed moral evaluation, which we could provide
first evidence on. However, the most important message is
arguably that research into the criteria is generally possible, and
we hope that our impetus will animate similar endeavors in
exploring the implications of observing individuals who endorse
certain strengths to a striking degree (paragons) or who can
inspire other individuals instead of belittling them (does not
diminish others).
Investigating the validity of the criteria is not without peril
because it means that character strengths can fail them, thus
casting a certain degree of doubt on the classification as a whole.
However, without this discussion and empirical studies, we
cannot know, and the classification cannot proceed in a fashion
Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 31) envisioned when they wrote:
“(. . .) we expect [the classification] to change in the years to come,
as theory and research concerning character strengths proceed.
(. . .) We anticipate that our classification of strengths will (. . .)
evolve, by adding or deleting specific strengths of character, by
combining those that prove redundant, by reformulating their
organization under core virtues, and by more systematically
evaluating them vis-à-vis our (. . .) criteria.”
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